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Abstract
The right framework for studying normative issues in infosociety and MAS is that of deliberate
or spontaneous social order, and intended or unintended, centralised or decentralised forms of so-
cial control. For effectively supporting human cooperation it is necessary to “incorporate” social
and normative knowledge in intelligent technology; computers should deal with—and thus partially
“understand”—permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust, etc. Here only one facet
of this problem is considered: the spontaneous and decentralised norm creation, and normative mon-
itoring and intervention. Cognitive aspects of spontaneous conventions, implicit commitments, tacit
agreements, and the bottom-up issuing and spreading of norms are discussed. The transition from
“face to face” normative relationships to some stronger constraints on agents’ action, and to institu-
tions and authority, and the possibility of a consequent increase of trust, are explored. In particular,
I focus on the transition from two party trust, right, permission, and commitment, to three party
relationships, where some witness or some enforcing authority is introduced. In this perspective of
‘formalising the informal’, i.e., the interpersonal unofficial normative matter, I discuss (also in order
to stress dangers of computer-based formalisation and enforcement of rules) the important phenom-
enon of functional (collaborative) systematic violation of rules in organisation and cooperation, and
the possible emergence of a “convention to violate”.
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1. Introduction: formalising the ‘informal’?The question in the title is rather ambiguous, in that it might be rephrased into at least
the following ones:
(i) Should we try to formalise (through deontic logic, etc.) and computationalise—
for computer supported interaction and MAS—not only the formal (legal, offi-
cial, explicit, institutional) aspects of social interactions and organisations, but also
the informal, implicit, spontaneous, bottom-up, forms of social control and—more
specifically—commitments, duties, expectations, prescriptions, permissions, etc., i.e.,
what I would call “micro-deontics” or “interpersonal normative relationships”?
(ii) This opens the general problem of the need to understand self-organising forms of
social order, the relationship between norms and other means for social order, and
to understand whether and how it is possible or necessary to “formalise” also those
phenomena. In other words: the deontic approach has until now been related to some
formal theory of intentional action (although the theory of its teleonomic nature has
been rather weak); should it be also related to a theory of functional behaviour, i.e., to
a theory of teleonomic but unintended effects of action?
The second meaning of “formal” obviously is: official, institutional. There is also a
third sense (related to the second): formal as rigid, precise but difficult to modify and
adjust/adapt to circumstances. In this perspective the question has a rather different
spirit.
(iii) Should we make precise, coherent, explicit but very rigid the rules, norms, conven-
tions that regulate real human interaction in organisations and groups, when we want
to give it computer support? Doesn’t this involve a serious danger of “rigor mor-
tis”1? How can we allow flexibility and the usual forms of informal trust, implicit
agreement, or the spontaneous emergence of expectations, conventions, duties, etc. in
info-societies?
My answer to question (i) is “yes”; the formalisation of spontaneous, bottom-up mech-
anisms for social order is necessary both for understanding and supporting it. However, in
the computer mediated human interaction and organisation, and in MAS, we must be quite
careful. The formalisation of formal and informal social control mechanisms should not
make them less flexible, and the organisation less dynamic and adaptive (thus the answer
to question (iii) is “no”).
As for point (ii), I think it is a very hard theoretical aim, but it is an unavoidable objective
both for scientific purposes and for a user-friendly computational environment.
In sum, I think that the issue of norms must be situated within the framework of Social
Control, and this, in turn, must be understood within the framework of Dynamic Social
Order. Moreover, I strongly believe that the problem of spontaneous and non-spontaneous
social order will be THE problem in MAS and info-societies. Let’s start from this.
1 I borrow this nice metaphor from L. Birnbaum (private conversation).
C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92 49
2. The framework: social order and social control2.1. The big problem (as I see it in the MAS perspective): Apocalypse now
I feel that the main trouble of infosocieties, distributed computing, Agent-based para-
digms, etc. will be—quite soon—that of the “social order” in the virtual or artificial society,
in the net, in MASs. In other terms, the problem of how to obtain from local design and
programming, and from local actions, interests, and views, some desirable and relatively
predictable/stable emergent results.
This problem is particularly serious in open environments and MASs, or in the case of
heterogeneous and self-interested agents, where a simple organisational solution doesn’t
work. This problem has several facets and has been presented under different perspectives;
for example as ‘emergent computation and indirect programming’ [10,25]; as ‘reconcil-
ing individual and global goals’ [30,37]; as the trade-off between agents’ initiative and
control; etc.). I will not discuss those specific approaches here.
2.2. Approaches and illusions
There are different “philosophies” about this very complex problem; different ap-
proaches and policies. For example:
• A Social Control (SC) approach that is focused on sanctions, incentives, control, rep-
utation, etc.
• An Organisational approach, relying on roles, division of labour, pre-established multi-
agent plans, negotiation, agreements, etc. [24,39,42].
• A Shared mind view of groups, teams, organisations, where coordination is due to
shared mental maps of the domain, task, and organisation, or to common knowledge
of the individual minds (organisation science, cognitive ergonomics, for example, Hoc
in press [29]).
• A Spontaneous Social Order approach (von Hayek’s style) where nobody can have in
mind, understand, monitor or plan the global effects of the “invisible hand” (swarm
intelligence; evolutionary or complexity-based approaches).
In human groups Social Order is the result of both spontaneous dynamics and or-
chestrated and designed actions and constrains. It can be the result of SC and of other
mechanisms like the “invisible hand”, social influence and learning, socialisation, etc. But
SC itself is ambiguous: it can be deliberate, official and institutional, or spontaneous, in-
formal, and even unaware.
To be schematic, let us put at one extreme the merely self-organising forms unrelated
to SC (for example, market equilibrium); on the other extreme the deliberate and planned
SC; and in between, forms of spontaneous, self-organising SC (Fig. 1).
In IT all of these approaches will prove to be useful. For the moment the most appealing
solutions are:
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• on one hand, what I would like to call the “organisational” solution (pre-established)
roles, some hierarchies, clear responsibilities, etc. This is more “designed”, engi-
neered, and rather reassuring!
• on the other hand, the “normative” or “deontic” solution, based on the formalisation of
permissions, obligations, authorisation, delegation, etc. logically controllable in their
coherence;2
• finally, the strictly “economic” solution based on free rational agent dealing with util-
ities and incentives in some form of market.
The problem is much more complex, and—in my view—several other convergent solu-
tions should be explored. However, I will consider here only one facet of the problem: the
spontaneous normative creation, monitoring and intervention.
In IT there are some illusions about possible solutions.
• The illusion of control: security vs. morality.
The first, spontaneous approach of engineers and computer scientists to those issues
is that of increasing security by certification, protocols, authentication, cryptography,
central control, rigid rules, etc. Although some of these measures are surely useful and
needed, as I said, I believe that the idea of a total control and a technical prevention
against chaos, conflicts and deception in computers is in some cases unrealistic and
even self-defeating, for example, with respect to building trust. Close to this illusion is
the formal-norm illusion that I have already criticised (see also Section 7).
• The socio-anthropological illusion: let’s embed technology in a social, moral and legal
human context.
In the area of information systems a perspective is already developing aimed at em-
bedding the information system in a complex socio-cultural environment where there
are—on the top of the technical and security layer—other layers related to legal as-
pects, social interaction, trust, and morality [28,40]. Surely this is a correct view. The
new technology can properly work for human purposes only if integrated and situated
in human morality, culture and law. However this is not enough.
2 These two solutions can be strongly related one with the other, since one can give a normative interpretation
and realisation of roles, hierarchies, organisations; for example see Jones and Sergot’ approach to institutions [35],
Carmo and Pacheco [5]; Royakkers and Dignum [54]; Santos, Jones and Carmo [57]; Barbuceanu [1].
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• For Intelligent Normative Supports (Agents).
I believe [13] that what is also needed is some attempt to “incorporate” part of these
layers and issues in the technology itself.
Especially within the intelligent and autonomous agents paradigm, I believe that it
is both possible and necessary to model these typically human and social notions.
In order effectively to support human cooperation—which is strongly based on so-
cial, moral, and legal notions—computers must be able to model and “understand” at
least partly what happens among the users. They should be able to manage—and thus
partially “understand”—for example, permissions, obligations, power, roles, commit-
ments, trust.
Moreover, to cope with the open, unpredictable social interaction and collective ac-
tivity that will emerge among them, the artificial agents themselves should base their
interaction on something like organisation, roles, commitments, norms, etc. This is in
fact what is happening in the domain of agents and MAS, where these topics are in the
focus of theoretical and formal modelling, and of some implementation.3
3. Social control approach to dynamic social order
Precisely because agents are relatively autonomous, act in an open world, on the basis
of their subjective and limited points of view and for their own interests or goals, Social Or-
der is a problem. There is no possibility of application for a pre-determined, “hardwired”
or designed social order. Social order has to be continuously restored and adjusted, dy-
namically produced by and through the action of the agents themselves; this is why social
control is necessary.
3.1. Social order
There are at least two notions of social order:
Given a system of multiple entities or sub-units, order is a structure of relationships
– among those entities,
– of each of them with the whole, and
– with the environment of the system.
Such a trim, structure or pattern is “regular”, which means either:
(α) corresponding to a given “regularity”, i.e., to a norm in statistical or previsional terms;
or
(β) corresponding to some rule (Latin: regula), i.e., some norm or standard in a norma-
tive/deontic sense.
3 Just to give some example see the research groups related to DEON Ws, ModelAge project, the ICMAS’96
Workshop on “Norms in MAS”, Kyoto, 1996; the AGENTS’2000 Workshop on “Norms in Agents”, Barcelona,
2000; the Project ALFEBIITE.
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The α-meaning is too broad and weak: order is just a recurrent or stable emergent
pattern. The β-meaning is stronger: the order is “intended” or at least desirable (from the
point of view of some agent) or “functional”. In any case, it is not simply accidental but
finalistic/teleonomic.
Social order is a non-accidental and non-chaotic (thus, relatively predictable, repeated
and stable) pattern of interactions in a given system of interfering agents, such that it
allows the satisfaction of the interests of some agent A (or avoids harm to them).4
Thus social order in a strict sense is relative to some system of interests or points of view
that makes it good (or bad), desirable (or undesirable). This point of view or reference can
be:
– a single lay agent or group (internal or external to the order: observer);
– an agent with a special role: an authority, able to orient the system towards such an
order;
– a shared goal, value, that is good for everybody or for most of the members (for exam-
ple to reduce or avoid accidents; to guarantee group survival; etc.);
– a real “common goal”, in a strictly cooperative group.
Dynamic social order obtains when the stable macro-pattern or equilibrium is main-
tained thanks to an incessant local (micro) activity of its units, capable of restoring or
reproducing the desired features. The global stability is due to local instability. Social or-
der is very dynamic, especially with autonomous agents.
3.2. Social control
Let’s also take SC in a strict sense, not as any form of socialisation and social influence
on agents (although obviously both can strongly contribute to social order). Let’s consider
SC only as the process through which, if/when an individual or a group deviates from the
expected and prescribed degree of obedience to a norm, its behaviour is led back to the
required degree of conformity [31]. Social control is a reaction to deviant behaviour, and
is strongly related to the notion of ‘sanction’ [51].
However, let us also consider pro-active actions, prevention of deviation and reinforce-
ment of correct behaviour, as well as “positive” sanctions, social approval (also implying
an implicit message/disapproval for deviant people) as part of SC.
I consider SC to comprise any action of an agent aimed at (intended or destined to)
enforcing the conformity of the behaviour of another agent to some social norm (in a
broad sense, including social roles, conventions, social commitments, etc.).5
4 The problem of social functions and functional order is far more complicated [9,44]. Let’s put it aside here.
5 I am close to Johnson’s [34] view that SC consists in the action of all those mechanisms that neutralize
deviant tendencies, either by preventing deviant behaviors, or—more important—by monitoring and inverting





Thus, not all socialisation is SC (there are also other purposes and functions in socialisa-
tion); not all social influence is SC. Moreover, not only negative sanctions and post-hoc
corrective interventions are SC.
As defined, SC strictly presupposes:
(a) some informal or formal, implicit or explicit, social or legal norm or convention in the
society/group,
(b) the possibility for the agent to deviate from it and to be led back (through psycholog-
ical means) to the right behaviour. SC presupposes autonomous agents, and possibly
decision makers and normative agents (about this area see note 8, and Verhagen [60]),
or at least some learning capability based on social rewards.
There are different forms of SC. It is useful to distinguish at least deliberative/intended Vs
unintended/functional SC; and centralised vs. decentralised SC (Table 1).
My claim (see also [20,22]) is that A is not the prototypical or the most efficacious form
of SC in open and dynamic MAS or societies;6 a fundamental role is played by C and D,
i.e., the spontaneous, bottom-up normative intervention of the distributed individuals, ei-
ther conscious of their effects and intending to make another conform to the norms, or not
intentionally oriented to this but in fact functional to this.7 For example, when Ag1—a
victim—complains for his/her pain or harm or aggressively reacts against Ag2 the culprit,
one of the effects and of the functions of these reactions is precisely to make Ag2’s behav-
iour conform to norms. Analogously, people just moving around in the city and observing
other people (what they are doing) are in fact exerting a form of non-voluntary SC, and this
behaviour actually reduces crimes (Section 4.2).
Decentralised and in particular unintended SC (Table 1, box D) are especially important
for understanding that SC also has some unplanned forms and contributes to a merely
emergent and self-organised Social Order.
Moreover, not only the monitoring and the intervention can be bottom-up and spon-
taneous (while the norm can still be formal and official); all normative bonds can be
the motivational factors that can produce the deviant behavior. I only find too general the idea of SC as all the
mechanisms that actually produce those effects. I prefer to restrict SC to those mechanisms aimed at producing
those effects (functions) [14].
6 Kaminka and Tambe [36] present interesting results. They claim that Agents in dynamic multi-agent envi-
ronments must monitor their peers to execute individual and group plans. They show that a centralized scheme
using a complex algorithm trades correctness for completeness and requires monitoring all teammates. By con-
trast, a simple distributed teamwork monitoring algorithm results in correct and complete detection of teamwork
failures, despite relying on limited, uncertain knowledge, and monitoring only key agents in a team.
7 One should also consider in C the ‘orchestrated’ and institutional but decentralised control, for example by
local authorities, policemen, and so on.
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bottom-up, informal and spontaneous: the very creation of conventions and norms, the
establishment of rights, duties, permissions, etc. can be sub-institutional, merely interper-
sonal and spontaneous.8
3.3. Three postulates
In sum, my analysis is framed by the following general assumptions:
• Social Order does not depend only on SC and is not reducible to SC.
Other mechanisms (for example, the so-called “invisible hand”, the emergent result of self-
interest) produce social order, like the natural division of labour, or the market equilibrium.
We do not in fact define social order as norm conformity. This would be too strong. Even
“desirable” social order is not simple or necessary norm-conformity. However, in this paper
we are interested in a SC approach to Social Order, not in other mechanisms for emergent,
self-organising Social Order.
• SC is not due to norms alone and is not reducible to them.9
There are various forms of and instruments for SC, beyond the explicit use of (social and
legal) norms; example imitation; incentives; learning; etc.
• Normative means are not only based on or reducible to formal, top down, institutional
norms.
As already mentioned, I will discuss in this paper the last point:
– the informal normative relationships, the Micro/Bottom-Up/Decentralised/Spontane-
ous Normative Social Control, and in particular
– some borderline phenomena between the interpersonal and the institutional layers.
8 Also the classical distinction between external and internal control (self-control) [31] is very important. True
norms are aimed in fact at the internal control by the addressee itself as a cognitive deliberative agent, able to
understand a norm as such and adopt it (see [19], and the first function of normative monitoring in Section 3.2).
Even more, norms are aimed at being adopted for specific reasons by the agents. The use of external control and
sanctions is only a sub-ideal situation and obligation [11]. In artificial agents internal control is possible with real
decision makers, be either norm-sensible agents or utility-sensible agents. Although self-control is surely very
important for social order and also for conformity to norms, I do not want to consider here it as a form of SC;
in fact our definition—following the social science tradition—has been in terms of two different agents (see also
Section 3.2). An unification is both reasonable and possible: it would be sufficient to allow that the controlling
agent and the deviant agent be just one and the same agent.
9 Although—as I said—SC always presupposes some form of norm or convention, the norm itself is not the
only means and strategy for obtaining conformity to norm. I can obtain conformity also by agents that lack any
normative mind and understanding.
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3.4. For a bottom-up approach to deontics: Formal authorities, legal institutions or
interpersonal deontic relationships?
Accordingly to a widespread view in AI, and IT in general, it is necessary to study,
model and support cooperation and Organisations in a “normative perspective”, as in-
stances of normative systems. I think that this normative view is absolutely correct and
unavoidable, but, I also think that this could mean two different (although complementary)
things.
On one side, one can have in mind the formal, official, “institutional” aspects of an
Organisation. Institutions in strong sense are normative systems, because they are set up
and regulated by laws, rules, “formal” roles and procedures, authorities. To formalise all
this (for example, the institutional formal power, its delegation, etc.) is very important. One
cannot understand and computationally support Organisations without formalising those
aspects (see, for example, the work by Jones, Sergot, Carmo, and several others).
On the other side, however, one should stress that also the “informal”, dynamic, inter-
personal aspects of Organisations are “normative”. It has been proved many times that real
Organisations do their jobs mainly thanks to the informal human relationships, informal
roles, informal procedures, interpersonal negotiations and commitments, personal powers,
willingness and initiative, etc. Current (post-Tayloristic) dominant models of Organisation
stress these aspects very much (although I think that “institutional” and “formal” aspects
remain unavoidable). Personally, I’m interested in the dialectic between the formal and the
informal, institutional and spontaneous, laws and conventions, etc.
In particular, I think that interpersonal informal commitments, groups, roles, etc. also
have a “normative” character.
Our group (at ISTC-CNR) tries to study the interpersonal basis of “rights” created by
social commitments; the spontaneous issuing of norms in groups and their cognitive in-
gredients. We also try to show the relationships between personal powers and role powers;
between objective dependence and institutional structures, etc. Our claim is that there is an
evolutionary and cognitive continuity between the merely interpersonal normative relations
and the institutional ones. We cannot understand and explain the latter without a theory of
the former, since the formal deontic stuff works through and thanks to the informal one,
and—more in general—through the social minds of the agents.
On the one hand, one cannot manage the organisational process just dealing with official
roles and rules. This would be too rigid, too constraining for workers and for their intel-
ligent contributions. On the other hand, one cannot model norms just by modelling their
logical relations, without modelling normative decision-making and normative influence
(issuing and accepting norms) [19].
In this perspective I present:
(a) our view of the spontaneous issuing of norms (accepting a norm as a norm is in fact
issuing it) and the spontaneous emergence of a decentralised social monitoring and
social sanctioning among normative agents.
(b) some simplified examples of a bottom-up approach to deontics; in particular, I con-
sider:
56 C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92
– the merely interpersonal (face to face) basis of more “institutional” relationships; in
particular I will focus on the ideal/conceptual step from a two-party normative rela-
tion to a three-party normative relation, where a third role (the witness, the group,
the authority able to control and enforce) emerges and deeply changes the relation-
ship; and
– the transition from no rights at all in expecting an other’s “help” to full rights (in ex-
plicit social commitments and even more in formal contracts) through the borderline
level of tacit agreements and implicit commitments.
4. Decentralised and spontaneous issuing and monitoring of norms as bottom-up
Social Control
4.1. Issuing social norms while adopting them
In our view [16,19,21] a social norm is not a norm without a general acknowledgement.
(At the legal level it is sufficient that the authority is recognised as authority and that
the norm is recognised as correctly issued by it.) Autonomous agents subject to norms
are in fact autonomous norm creators. They create norms through their evaluation and
recognition, through their compliance, and through their interpersonal issuing, monitoring
and judging of norms and behaviours.
Norms are multi-faceted and MA objects requiring different role players: in issuing a
norm, the “legislator”; in norm acceptance or recognition, the observer or addressee; in
norm obedience, compliance, or violation the addressee; in norm monitoring the “police-
man”, the judge, the bystander; in normative punishment or approval, the policeman, the
bystander. The creation or formation of norms occurs not only when the “legislator” is is-
suing them. Social norms are collective cooperative constructions, based upon implicit or
explicit agreement, convergence and expectations. Therefore, even norm recognition is in
fact an act of norm formation, and this act is autonomous.
Also consider that the “legislator” is not necessarily an “official” institutional person.
His function may be a decentralised role: any agent that prescribes a given behaviour as
a norm to other agents (or to himself) is in fact issuing (or re-issuing) that norm. Since
any norm-addressee who accepts the norm (and in particular, who obeys it) wants the
norm to be obeyed by the other addressees, each (respectful) addressee also becomes an
informal legislator and an inspector. Indeed, norm-formation is a continuous, spontaneous,
decentralised process executed by autonomous normative and interactive agents.
Conte and Castelfranchi [15] claim that the decision to conform to what is perceived to
be an obligation plays a relevant role in its spreading over a population of cognitive agents.
While the conventionalist view derives social norms from the spreading of conformity, in
our view conformity is derived, so to speak, from the spreading of obligation-recognition
and—adoption. The very act of accepting an obligation implies and turns into enforcing it.
An agent respecting the obligation turns into a supporter. Conforming leads to prescribing.
The agent under an obligation becomes a legislator. The more an obligatory behaviour is
believed to be prescribed, the more it will be complied with, and the more, in turn, its
prescription will be enforced.
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Rather than acting only through a behavioural contagion or a passive social impact, the
spreading of norms is affected by cognition in a variety of ways [15]:
(i) It leads to implementing effective conformity. When an autonomous agent recognises
a norm as a norm and decides to conform to it, the number of conformers will be
increased, and the norm is more effective. This is equivalent to the effect of imitation,
but it is based on the mediation of a norm and of its recognition (representation) in
the individual mind. Each individual is influencing the others but through more sub-
tle mechanisms than simple imitation or contagion. From an individual’s behaviour
the others form normative beliefs, and beliefs about the degree to which the norm is
effective and obeyed, and they decide whether to obey or not.
(ii) Effective conformity contributes to the spreading of normative beliefs. The larger the
number of conforming agents, more likely the observers will form normative beliefs.
However, the formation of normative assumptions is conditioned to a number of con-
textual clues which activate the inferential mechanisms mentioned above. In other
terms, the spreading of normative conformity is not a self-enforcing mechanism, as
the conventionalist approach seems to assume. It is necessarily mediated by cognitive
mechanisms.
(iii) The spread of normative beliefs contributes to the spreading of normative actions. The
wider the spread of normative beliefs, the higher the chances that conformity is due
to the formation of normative goals (cognitively, a goal relativised to the belief that
one is addressed by a given norm; formally, a goal arising at the intersection between
goals and normative beliefs; for a treatment, see Conte and Castelfranchi [19]). This
is also allowed by some reasoning mechanisms and rules, for example reciprocation
(if I believe to benefit from a given behaviour, I will be more likely to display the
same behaviour as long as I believe it is generally prescribed that benefits should be
somehow returned).
(iv) The spread of normative actions contributes to the spreading of normative influence.
The larger the number of agents conforming to one given norm, and the more distrib-
uted will be the want that other agents will conform to the same norm. This is due
to:
(a) An equity rule. People do not want others in the same conditions as their own to
sustain lower costs—benefits being equal (this is, indeed, one the most probable
explanations of the group sanction control: the more agents respect the norms,
and the more likely they will be to urge others to do the same).
(b) “Norm-sharing”. Agents are likely to “share” the respected norms, that is, to
believe that those norms are sensible, useful, necessary, etc. This is also a power-
ful self-defensive mechanism (agents share the norms they happened to respect).
Agents will defend the norms they share, implementing the number of agents who
want those norms to be respected.
(v) The spread of normative influence contributes to the spreading of normative beliefs,
and the whole process is started again in a circular way. This type of model evidently
lends itself to validation through computer simulation.
58 C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92
4.2. Distributed spontaneous norm monitoring and social controlConte and Dignum [22] claim that once norms and institutions have emerged, they allow
for other cognitive objects to emerge, for example the expectation that norms exist and must
be fulfilled. Through social monitoring agents find a fundamental source of information
about which specific norms are impinging on a given set of agents. They will observe others
to find out what norms are in force in that particular social context. In case discrepancies
between themselves and others are found out, they may decide that others apply a (set of)
norms which they were not aware of. Consider the case of a newcomer entering a social
setting. How will she know what rules should she follow? One fundamental way to get this
information without being perceived as an outsider is to observe others.
To sum up, they speak about x monitoring a given set of agents Y , when either
(a) x checks for discrepancies between itself and Y in order to adjust itself to Y—in such a
case x has Y ’s behaviours, preferences etc. as a criterion for reducing discrepancies—
or
(b) x checks Y in order to find out instances of standards (possibly normative and moral
ones)—in such a case, x has abstract standards (to be instantiated) as a criterion for
reducing discrepancies.
They analyse the difference between these two possibilities in terms of the mental re-
quirements each involves. In the former case, x has no idea of abstract standards and
accepts others’ behaviours as concrete standards for its own behaviour. In the latter, in-
stead, x knows that a standard whatsoever (e.g., a norm), exists and may operate on Y .
Given my definition of Social Control I have to stress another fundamental function and
form of normative monitoring. If social monitoring is necessary for comparing and con-
forming our behaviour, and for recognising possible existing norms (and for ‘establishing’
them), it is also aimed at ‘surveillance’, i.e., at identifying deviant behaviours of others.
There are two ways to conformity: the adjustment of our behaviour to the standards or
to the others; the pressure on the others in order they conform. Both ways require decen-
tralised social monitoring, but as for ‘Social control’ the second one is more typical and
crucial.
This is also coherent with our analysis of ‘expectations’ as something richer than simple
forecasts [8]. An expectations implies in fact not only beliefs about the future, but also a
motivational component: desires, wishes, or goals about the expected event. Expectations
can be ‘positive’ (when the predicted event is also wanted) or ‘negative’, like in fear (when
the predicted event is undesirable). Normative expectations in normative monitoring are
‘positive’ expectations, because agents not only anticipate the others’ behavioural confor-
mity to a norm, but they wish it. In fact norm violation does not entail simple surprise or
belief revision; it produces disappointment. Agents react to violations with some form of
aggression, criticism, blame, or changing their opinion about the violator (its ‘reputation’).
This ‘reaction to deviant behaviour’ (see definitions of Social Control, Section 3.2) is a
form of decentralised sanction: sometimes intentionally aimed to punish the culprit (Ta-
ble 1, box C) and to ‘led back its behaviour to conformity’, sometimes just functional to
this aim (Table 1, box D). In other words, SC implies the possibility of a social conflict
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between the controlling and the controlled agent. While the deviant agent y has the goal
of Doing a, which is a violation, the monitoring agent x has the goal that y does not Do a,
and—since y is a cognitive agent—x has the goal that y does not Intend to Do a. This is a
special and important kind of social conflict: y has the goal that p (intends to do a), while
x has the goal that y have not the goal that p (does not intend to do a) [12]. Conte and
Dignum [22] identify this function (they call it ‘consequence’) of normative monitoring, as
“norm-based social control”. Agents exercise social control when they monitor one another
with regard to a (set of) norm(s) that they have acknowledged as such. They also correctly
claim that agents can check one another with regard to acknowledged norms, even when
they are not directly concerned by them.
I just make explicit in this view that social control requires not only ‘monitoring’ and
evaluation, but also ‘control’ which is monitoring plus intervention to led the possibly
deviant behaviour to its ‘standard’.
5. Some steps from the interpersonal to the institutional
In this section I examine the transition from merely interpersonal (face to face) to more
“institutional” relationships; in particular I focus on that ideal/conceptual step from a two-
party normative relation to a three-party normative relation, where a third role (the witness,
the group, the authority able to control and enforce) emerges and deeply changes the socio-
cognitive relationship. We will see this in trust, in rights, in permission.
5.1. From interpersonal trust to a three party relationship
5.1.1. A cognitive anatomy of trust
Let me briefly introduce our cognitive analysis of trust (for a more complete presenta-
tion see Castelfranchi and Falcone [17]. In our model we specify which structure of beliefs
and goals characterise x’s trust in another agent y .
First, one trusts another only relatively to a positive expectation, i.e., for something
s/he wants to achieve, that s/he desires. If x does not have any concern and goal, she
cannot really decide, nor care about something (welfare): she cannot subjectively “trust”
somebody.
Second, at this level, trust itself consists of beliefs. Trust basically is a mental state, a
complex mental attitude of an agent x towards another agent y about the behaviour/action a
relevant for the result (goal) g.
• x is the relying agent who feels trust (truster); a cognitive agent endowed with internal
explicit goals and beliefs;
• y is the agent or entity which is trusted (trustee); y is not necessarily a cognitive agent
(however, I consider here only cognitive agents, i.e., social trust). So
• x trusts y “about” g/a (where g is a specific world state, and a is an action that
produces that world state g) and “for” g/a; x trusts also “that” g will be true.
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Since y’s action is useful to x , and x is relying on it, this means that x is “delegating” some
action/goal in her own plan to y . This is the strict relation between trust and reliance or
delegation. Trust is the mental counter-part of the act of reliance.
We summarise the main beliefs in our model:
(1) “Competence” belief : a positive evaluation of y is necessary, i.e., x should believe
that y is useful for this goal of hers, that y can produce/provide the expected result,
that y can play such a role in her plan/action, that y has some function.
(2) “Disposition” belief : Moreover, x should believe that y is not only able to perform
that action/task, but y will actually do what x needs (predictability).
(3) Fulfilment belief : x believes that g will be achieved (thanks to y in this case). This is
the “trust that” g.
When y is a cognitive agent, these beliefs need to be articulated in and supported
by more precise beliefs about y’s mind and/or personality: these make y’s behaviour
predictable. In particular, predictability should be supported by and analysed in:
(4) Willingness belief : x believes that y has decided and intends to do a. In fact for this
kind of agent to do something, it must intend to do it. So trust requires modelling the
mind of the other.
(5) Persistence belief : x should also believe that y is stable enough in his intentions, that y
has no serious conflicts about a (otherwise y might change his mind), or that y is not
unpredictable by character, etc.
Let’s simplify and formalise this. By introducing some “ad hoc” predicate (like WillDo, or
Persist)10 in the logic of Meyer et al. [59], we might characterise the social trust mental
state as follows:













PracPossy(α, g)= 〈Doy(α)〉g ∧ Abilityy(α).
To formalise results and opportunities this formalism borrows constructs from dynamic
logic: 〈Doi (α)〉g denotes that agent i has the opportunity to perform the action α in such a
way that g will result from this performance.
In other words, trust is a set of mental attitudes characterising the mind of the “delegat-
ing agent” who prefers another agent doing the action; y is a cognitive agent, so x believes
and wishes that y intends to do the action and y will persist in this.
10 Of course, this deserves more elaboration and a specific work to introduce temporal specifications in this
logics. This is beyond the aims of this paper.
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5.1.2. Degrees of trust
The idea that trust is scalable is common (in common sense, in social sciences, in
AI). However, since no real definition and cognitive characterisation of trust is given, the
quantification of trust is quite ad hoc and arbitrary, and the introduction of this notion or
predicate is semantically empty. On the contrary, we claim that there is a strong coherence
between the cognitive definition of trust, its mental ingredients, and, on the one side, its
value, and on the other side, its social functions and its affective aspects. More precisely
the latter are based on the former.
In our model we ground the degree of trust of x in y , in the cognitive components of x’s
mental state of trust. More precisely, the degree of trust is a function of the subjective
certainty of the relevant beliefs. We use the degree of trust to formalise a rational basis
for the decision of relying and betting on y . We also claim that the “quantitative” aspect
of another basic ingredient is relevant: the value or importance or utility of the goal g. In
sum,
the quantitative dimensions of trust are based on the quantitative dimensions of its cog-
nitive constituents.
For us trust is not an arbitrary index with operational importance, without a real content,
but it is based on the subjective certainty of the relevant beliefs which support each other
and the decision to trust (Fig. 2).
There is threshold for the decision to trust y (which entails a risk and a bet). We eval-
uate both the external attribution of trust, i.e., the environmental favouring conditions and
opportunities for y’s successful action, and the internal attribution of trustworthiness to y
(trust in y). This trust in y has two facets: competence and willingness. Each of them is
Fig. 2.
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based on and analysed in termd of other beliefs about y (for example y’s motives or know
how). The final decision about relying on y’s action, will be taken on the basis of the
strength of those beliefs about y and about the environment.
5.1.3. From two to three agents
We claim that no exchange, no cooperation, no organisation is possible without trust.
One might object that we overstate the importance of trust in social actions (such as con-
tracting) and organisations. In fact, it might be argued that people put contracts in place
precisely because they do not trust the agents they delegate tasks to. Since there is no trust
people want to be protected by the contract. The key in these cases would not be trust but
the ability of some authority to assess contract violations and to punish the violators. Anal-
ogously, in organisations people would not rely on trust but on authorisation, permission,
obligations and so forth.
In our view this is correct only if one adopts a quite limited view of trust in terms of
beliefs relative to the character or friendliness, etc. of the trustee (delegated agent). In fact
in these cases (contracts, organisations) we just deal with a more complex and specific kind
of trust. But trust is always crucial. We put a contract in place only because we believe
that the agent will not violate the contract, and this is precisely “trust”. We base this trust
in the contractor (the belief that she will do what promised) either on the belief that is a
moral person and keeps her promises, or on the belief that worries about law and punish-
ment.
To be more clear, this level of trust is a three party relationship: it is a relation between
a client x , a contractor y and the authority A. And there are three trust sub-relations in it
(see Fig. 3):
Trust(x, y, τ )= BxAbilityy(α)∧BxWillDoy(α, g),
Trust(x,A, τ ′)= BxAbilityA(α′)∧BxWillDoA(α′, g′),
Trust(y,A, τ ′)= ByAbilityA(α′)∧ByWillDoA(α′, g′),
where τ is the task that y must perform for x; τ ′ the task that A must perform for x to-
wards y , i.e., check, supervision, guarantee, punishment, etc. (Of course, y’s trust about τ ′
is strange, since τ ′ is a danger for her—see later). More precisely and importantly in x’s
Fig. 3.
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And this expectation is the new level of x’s trust in the contractor. X trusts y by believing
that y will do what promised because of her honesty or because of her respect/fear toward
A. In other words, x relies on a form of paradoxical trust of y in A: x believes that y
believes that A is able to control, to punish, etc.
Of course, normally a contract is bilateral and symmetric, thus the point of view of y’s
should be added, and her trust in x and in A as for monitoring x . Notice that y’s beliefs
about A are precisely y’s trust in the authority when she is the client, while, when y is the
contractor, the same beliefs are the bases of her respect/fear toward A.
5.1.4. (Positive) trust vs aversive trust: The common core of trust and fear
There is a paradoxical but crucial form of trust, which is “trust” in threats and threaten-
ing agents: fear as a form of trust. The basic core of the two attitudes is in fact the same.
This is important since what in a given circumstance appears as worry and fear produces
in another circumstance a normal trust. As we just said, in a contract x trusts y because x
trusts the authority’s ability to punish y in case of violation, and because x trusts y’s fear of
authority and punishments. But y’s fear of authority is precisely her trust in the authority’s
ability to check and punish x (and vice versa): the same evaluations on the authority are at
the same time trust it and wonderment/awe/fear depending on the point of view.
The core components of these two mental attitudes of positive and negative respect are
the same, and we already identified them:
BxAbilityy(α)∧BxWillDoy(α, g).
We presented them as the two basic beliefs of (positive) trust, but this in fact only depends
on x’s goal: if x has the goal g
(Goalxg)
we have a positive expectation [8] and then true (positive) Trust. On the other hand, if x
does not want what she expects
(Goalx¬g)
we have negative expectation and a paradoxical aversive trust. In this case, for x y’s power
of doing α is a threat, is a negative power, and y’s propensity (example willingness) to do α
is a bad-will. The presence of the positive goal makes the two beliefs the core of ‘reliability’
and Trust; the presence of the negative goal makes them the core of y’s frightens. Using
one and the same predicate is incisive but not correct (given our definition).
Reliability and trust are what makes promises effective (in fact, what is promised is a
goal of x). Fright is what makes threats effective (since what is threatened is the opposite
of a goal of x).11
11 When we say “it promises to rain” or “it threats to rain” our beliefs are the same, only our goal (and then our
attitude) changes: in the first case we want rain, in the second we dislike it.
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In sum, in contract and organisation it is true that “personal” trust in y may not be
enough, but what we put in place is a higher level of trust which is our trust in the authority
but also our trust in y as for acknowledging, worrying about and respecting the authority.
Without this trust in y the contract would be useless. This is even more obvious if we think
of possible alternative partners in contracts: how to choose among different contractors at
the same conditions? Precisely on the basis of our degree of trust in each of them (trust
concerning their reliability in respecting the contract). As we said these more complex
kinds of trust are just richer specifications of the reasons for y’s doing what we expect:
reasons for y’s predictability (WillDo) which is based on her willingness (IntedToDo); and
reasons for her willingness (Fig. 2) (she will do α, either because of her selfish interest, or
because of her friendliness, or because of her honesty, or because of her fear of punishment:
several different bases of trust).
The efficacy of false beliefs. It is worth noticing that for this triangular social relation to
work, it is not strictly necessary that all the agents have those beliefs and that those beliefs
are true. First, what really matters for y being reliable (and x trusting y) is that (x believes
that) y believes in/trusts the Authority. X might even not believe or trust himself A; he
might cynically exploit y’s credulity and fear.
Second, suppose a population of agents with some god that guards promises, pacts,
and social taboos, and punishes the violators; for social trust-based relations to work, this
credulity, these misbeliefs are enough and work very well. I mean: it is not necessary that
such an Authority really exists and sanctions people; what is necessary and sufficient is
that people believe and fear this. Sometimes, misbeliefs can be adaptive and can be useful
for agents and societies in spite of their being false! [23].
5.1.5. Increasing trust: From intentions to contracts, from unilateral weak-reliance to
formal commitments
What we have just described are not only different kinds and different bases of trust
(from personal to authority based). They can also be conceived as different steps of social
trust and additional supports for trust. We mean that one basis does not necessary elimi-
nate the other but can supplement it or replace it when is not sufficient. If I do not trust
enough your personal persistence I can trust your keeping your promises, and if this is not
enough I can trust you to respect the laws or worry about punishments.
We consider these ‘motivations’ and ‘commitments’ not all equivalent: some are
stronger or more cogent than others.
Let me analyse this point more carefully, by comparing 5 scenarios of reliance:
(a) Intention ascription.
X is ‘weakly delegating’ y a task τ (let’s say to raise his arm and stop the bus) just on
the basis on the hypothetical ascription of an intention to y (he intends to stop the bus in
order to take the bus).
There are two problems in this kind of situation:
– the ascription of the intention is just based on abduction and defeasible inferences, and
to rely on this is quite risky (we can do this when the situation is very clear and very
constrained by a script, like at the bus stop);
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– this is just a private intention and a personal commitment to a given action; y can
change his private mind as he likes; he has no social bonds in doing this.
(b) Intention declaration.
X is weakly delegating y a task τ (to raise his arm and stop the bus) on the basis not
only of y’s situation and behaviour (the current script) but also or just on the basis of a
declaration of intention by y . In this case both the previous problems are less serious:
– the ascription of the intention is more safe and reliable (excluding deception that would
introduce normative aspects that we consider in more advanced scenarios);
– now y knows that x knows about his intention and about his declaring his intention;
there is no promise and no social commitment to x , but at least changing his mind y
should care for x’s evaluation of his coherence or sincerity or fickleness; thus he will
feel a bit more bound to his declared intention, and x can rely a bit more safely on it.
In other terms x’s degree of trust can increase because of:
• either a larger evidence;
• or a larger number of motives and reasons for y doing τ ;
• or the stronger value of the involved goals/motives of y .
There is an implicit law here: the greater the number of independent motives for doing τ ,
and the greater their importance or values, the greater the probability that τ will be exe-
cuted.
(c) Promises.
Promises are stronger than simple declaration or knowledge of the intention of another
agent. Promises create what we called a Social Commitment, which is a right-producing
act, and determine rights for x and duties/obligations for y . We claim that this is indepen-
dent of laws, authorities, punishments. It is just at the micro level, as inter-personal, direct
relation (not mediated by a third party, be it a group, an authority, etc.).
Social Commitment. Social Commitment, is not just personal, private commitment to a
give intention: it is a social relation. More precisely [7]:
(a) a social Commitment is a form of “Goal Adoption”. In other terms: y is committed to x
to do a, if x is interested in a. The result of a is a goal of x; for this reason, x has the
goal that y does a. Thus we should include in the formal definition of S-Commitment
the fact that (S-COMM y x a) implies that (GOAL x (DOES y a)).
(b) If y is S-Committed to x , then x can (is entitled to):
– control if y does what he “promised”;
– exact/require that he does it;
– complain/protest with y if he doesn’t do a;
– (in some cases) make good his losses (pledges, compensations, retaliations, . . .).
Y and x mutually know that y intends to do a and that this is x’s goal, and that as for
a x has specific rights on y (x is entitled by y to a).
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The very act of committing oneself to someone else is a “right-producing” act: before
the S-Commitment, before the “promise”, x has no rights over y , x is not entitled
(by y) to exact this action. After the S-Commitment a new and crucial social relation
exists: x has some rights towards y , she is entitled by the very act of Commitment on
y’s part. That x has the rights of controlling, etc., means that y is S-Committed to x
not to oppose these rights of x (in this way, y “acknowledges” these rights of x) (see
Section 5.2).
What I just said implies also that if y is S-Committed to x , he has a duty, an obligation;
he ought to do what he is Committed to.12
Of course, not all the adoptions of a goal of x by y imply a S-Commitment of y to x .
What else is required? First, the Mutual Knowledge I already mentioned. Second, x’s
agreement. In fact, if y has just the private Commitment (intention) [18] to favour one
of x’s goals, this is not sufficient (even if there is common awareness): x should “ac-
cept” this. In other words, she has decided that she is Committed to achieving her goal
by means of y’s action. This acceptance being known by y , there is an agreement.
Then, the S-Commitment by y implies some sort of S-Commitment by x to y to ac-
cept y’s action (x doesn’t refuse, doesn’t protest, doesn’t say “who told you!”, . . .).
Without such (often implicit—see later) agreement (which is close to a reciprocal
S-Commitment) no true S-Commitment of y to x has been established.
When y is committed, a is more than an Intention of y , it is a special kind of goal,
more cogent. The more cogent and normative nature of S-Commitment explains why
abandoning a Joint Intention or plan, a coalition or a team is not so simple as dropping
a private Intention. In fact, one cannot ecape a S-Commitment in the same way one
can escape a private Commitment.
If x changes his mind he disappoints y’s justified expectations and frustrates y’s rights.
He must expect and undergo y’s disappointment, hostility and protests. He is probably
violating shared values (since he agreed to y’s expectations and rights) and then is exposed
to internal bad feelings like shame and guilt. Probably he does not like all this. This means
that there are additional goals/motives that create incentives for persisting in the intention.
The truster can reasonably have more trust.
Notice that in promises the declaration is also more constraining: to lie is weightier.
(d) Promises with witness and oaths.
Even stronger is a promise in front of a witness, or an oath (which is sworn to god).
In fact, there are additional bad consequences in case of violation. Y would jeopardise his
reputation (with very bad potential consequences; see (Castelfranchi et al. [15])) receiving
a bad evaluation also from the witness; or he is bad in front of god eliciting his punishment.
Thus if I do not trust what you say you will do I will ask you to promise this; and if
I do not trust your promise I ask you to promise in front of other people or to oath about
12 Such creation of interpersonal obligations and rights through S-Commitments (‘micro-deontics’) will require
a general approach to deontics that allows contradictions among deontic contexts and hierarchical levels (in this
direction, see contributions in DEON workshops). For example, a killer gets an obligation to his instigator to
murder somebody, but, from the point of view of the society such an obligation is in contrast with a prohibition
(law) and with a much stronger obligation.
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this. If I worry that you might deny your promise, I will ask make it in writing and sign
something. And so on.
(e) Contracts.
Even public promises might be not enough and we may proceed by adding binds to
binds in order to make y more predictable and more reliable. In particular we might exploit
more the third party. We can have a group [58], an authority able to issue norms (defending
rights and creating obligations), to control violation, to punish violators. Of course this
authority or reference group must be shared and acknowledged, and, as we said, trusted by
both x and y (Fig. 2). Thus we have an additional problem of trust. However, now y has
additional reasons for keeping his commitment, and x’s degree of trust is higher.
Notice that all these additional beliefs about y are specific kinds or facets of the trust
in y: x trusts that y is respectful of norms, or that y fears punishments; x trusts y’s honesty
or shame or interest in good reputation, etc.
More precisely:
the stronger y’s motive for doing τ and then the stronger his commitment to τ ;
the larger the number of those motives;
and the stronger x’s beliefs about this;
the stronger it will be x’s trust in y as for doing τ .
5.1.6. The roles of the third party
As we saw the role of the third party is very interesting and complex in promises, social
commitments, and norm obedience, and deserves further analysis.
• On the one hand, she is a witness; she can testify that a given promise was made,
she can be used in controversies as an independent and non-biased, non-interested
memory.
• On the other hand, she can be a mediator; for example having memory of previous
deals, she can “certify” the reputation of a given agent, and I can ask her about this; or
she can be a mediator during the negotiation, since from outside she can have a better
view of possible and fair compromises.
• Moreover, she can be a guard of our norms: although not being directly victim of some
bad act, she can both monitor and report to the authority, or even punish the culprit by
censuring that behaviour or by spreading a bad reputation.
• The third party can be the group itself we belong to, and it can play the role of the
Authority issuing our social/group norm; thus it can make our commitment stronger
by putting on it the norm of respecting promises, and monitoring about this. It might
also be able and willing to enforce the respect of the promise/contract, or to punish the
violation of norms. In other words, it can play the full role of the normative Authority:
issuing, monitoring, enforcing, sanctioning.
In a sense as we saw in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 true norms (also social norms) are necessarily
“three party” or better multi-party relationships.
68 C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92Fig. 4.
5.2. Interpersonal rights
I call “interpersonal rights” those rights that are not necessarily established by some law
and imposed by some authority. Let me consider their “psychology”. Consider the mental
attitudes of two agents when one is claiming a right, and the other is acknowledging it
(Fig. 4). Suppose that, on a bus, I want you to give me your seat because I think (and I
want you to acknowledge) that this is my right (suppose I am a pregnant woman, an old
man, etc.); and suppose that there is no official norm or rule about this. My goal is that
you leave your seat, but this is not sufficient. For example, if, for independent reasons
(the bus arrived at your bus stop), you leave, your seat is free but my right has not been
acknowledged. What is necessary here is Goal-Adoption: you have to know and adopt my
goal. But even this is not sufficient: I pretend much more from your mind: I want you
to adopt my goal with a specific mental attitude and for specific reasons (higher-goals,
motivations).
You might leave your seat just out of pity: this is not “acknowledging my right”; you
might do it out of love, sympathy, courtship: but this is not “acknowledging my right”
either. You could do it out of fear or interest, because I’m very strong and I’m threatening
you, or because I offered you 2 dollars: again, this is not “acknowledging my right”.
Summing up, I don’t want you to adopt my goal only. I want you to do this because you
believe (agree) that this is my right, that my request/expectation is correct and you perform
the action in order to respect rights.
This is not the forum for analysing the meaning of doing something “because it is right,
correct”. I think that “right” in this case means something like: “conform to a moral norm,
to a value, to a law”. Claiming a right is always searching for a shared value [45,46]. I’m
interested here in x’s claim about y’s mind in doing what he needs her to do. Why should
we be so interested in the mind behind the action, when seemingly what we practically
need is that action? The truth is that we do not need only or mainly the required action.
In the case of rights it is quite clear which are the very different social consequences of
the different attitudes you have in adopting my goal. If you do it for pity, this means that
I’m inferior and powerless. If you do it out of pity, love, sympathy, generosity, etc., I’m in
debt, I have to be grateful. On the contrary, if it is my right I’m not in debt: it is you that
are indebted if you do not respect/satisfy my right. In general, different mental attitudes
in compliance not only presuppose very different social relations, but make very different
both the probability of the Goal Adoption, its readiness, and the future consequences for
the social relations (for example in terms of credits and debts).
5.2.1. The Authority mediation
This socio-psychological relationship becomes quite different if we introduce in it some
third party or better some authority, aimed at monitoring and enforcing the right (Fig. 5). At
this point, x is no longer asking y to acknowledge her right, to give her this “precedence”;
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she is claiming from A such a right recognition and establishment.13 That x has such a
right becomes an explicit or implicit norm, an imperative issued by A. More precisely it is
a twofold object or message: on the one side, A says to x “you may, you are permitted”, on
the other side, A says to y “you must allow, you are prohibited from preventing x from . . .”.
The right of x is implemented into the duty of y of not opposing to it. Notice that x is now
permitted by A, not really by y; or better, y might just practically_ permit x to do the
relevant action without really and personally acknowledging her right (without necessarily
agreeing that it is right, fair), just because he is obliged and he fears A. Nevertheless x’s
right is acknowledged in that group: it is officially acknowledged by A and practically
acknowledged by y .
While in the interpersonal rights the source of x’s right is y , in the three party case the
source of x’s right is A. X’s claim is no longer a moral or socio-psychological claim, but
a “political” issue: should A accept and then impose the pretence of x as a right? At the
mere interpersonal level x cannot enforce the recognition of her right as a right, and she
can only try to convince y and achieve an agreement based on values. At that more insti-
tutionalised level (where there is a recognised authority) x must persuade A (in claiming
a social recognition) but can enforce y’s respectful behaviour. Again, y’s behaviour would
be more reliable in this case; the social order seems more protected.
However, authority and sanctions cannot make shared values and interpersonal deontics
superfluous: it is impossible to maintain social order without fair personal relationships
and shared values, just on the basis of surveillance, central sanctions or fear.
After having examined the role of this triangular relationship in trust and promises/com-
mitments, and in the acknowledgement of rights, let’s give a look at the same borderline
phenomena in the theory of permission. Permitting also starts in my view before in-
stitutions, norms, authority, and empowerment, just at the interpersonal level, as letting
somebody do something in specific circumstances.
5.3. Practical permissions
Let me attempt to analyse permission in terms of a cognitive-social relation between
two agents [9]:
13 Or, better, x is now asking y to recognise that there is an official norm and to conform to it because it is a
norm.
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If something is “permitted”, it is permitted to somebody (y), by somebody (x).
The analytic enquiry of deontic modalities (obligatory, permitted, etc.) has been de-
veloped before and independently of the logic modelling of mental attitudes, of cognitive
agent architecture, and of social interaction; it taken place following the blue print of non-
deontic modalities (necessary; possible). We might consider this kind of approach and this
use of the logic as basically anti-mentalistic: one tries to define, formalise, and to reason
about obligation and permission substantially ignoring the mind of the involved agents.14
Thus, traditional treatment of deontic modalities is very problematic for a cognitive sci-
entist. Let me explain why. As a cognitive scientist aimed at providing cognitive models
of social relations and interactions [19], I have the impression that current treatment by
deontic logic does not help us so much to understand these crucial issues.
• Obligations and permissions are just relative to actions, i.e., to the behaviour of a
cognitive agent (a behaviour based on beliefs and directed by goals).
There cannot be obligations/permissions on mere world states and events except as results
of an action by some agent.
• Obligation and permission are addressed to a mind, and although pointing to behav-
iour they are implicitly referring to mental attitudes. More than this: obligations and
permissions are relations between minds and can be fully understood only in this per-
spective.15
I analyse some basic aspects of the social relation between x and y and of their minds.
In [9] elements of dependence relations, power, goal adoption, and social commitment,
are identified as ingredient of the notion of “permitted” and of the Permission relation
between x and y .
I consider “permission” in face-to-face, everyday interactions among agents not en-
dowed with special roles, without analysing the normative or even the legal or institutional
permission. I think that interpersonal or practical permission is both the conceptual and
the practical forerunner of the normative and institutional permission. I claim that under-
standing the former is a necessary, though non-sufficient, condition for understanding the
latter. At the end of Section 5.3 I will say something about the Interpersonal Normative
Permission, contrasting it with the Interpersonal Practical Permission. I will say nothing
about the Institutional Permission (a complex form of the Normative one): I basically agree
with Jones and Sergot’ analysis of the institutional level, although I think that their formal
apparatus (deontic and action logic) is not able to express the underlying cognitive and
14 This criticism is close to Pearl’s claim about the “isolationistic” attitude of deontic logics [52].
15 In several languages the meaning of the verb “to permit” is broader than that of the noun “permission” and
of the locution “to give the permission”. For example it is possible to say that a physical agent “permitted” to a
behavioural agent to do something (“rain did not permit John . . .”). In this use “to permit” is related to “prevent”
not to “prohibit”. I will consider only the meaning of “to permit” that is in some sense opposed to “to prohibit”
and is close to “to give the permission”.
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social relations that I describe for the Practical Permission and that I claim to hold also in
the other forms of Permission.
My working examples of interpersonal practical permission are the following ones:
(1) y intends to enter a room, in the middle of the door there is x; y asks x “could you let
me pass, please” and y answers “please” moving away.
(2) two children on a beach are writing on the sand with some pipes used as pens. x’s pipe
is good, y’s pipe is not good at all. x puts aside his pipe and y asks him: “may I use
that?”, x replies: “yes, but later you give it back to me”.
I think that current developments in AI, philosophy, and logic relative to mental attitudes,
rational action, agent architecture (especially BDI models: for example, Bratman et al. [4];
Rao and Georgeff [53]; Bell [2]), and Multi-Agent Systems, will allow the expression of
the mental and relational core of this notion. In this preliminary exploration I will adopt
a naive attitude, substantially ignoring the rich and subtle philosophical literature on the
topic (mainly on legal, institutional form of permission), just reacting to some basic and
consolidated notions, trying to build up on a socio-cognitive ground this ontology. I will
not propose any formalisation, but just point out some aspects that should be formalised.
5.3.1. Permission is not the absence of prohibition
On the basis of previous claims it should be clear that and why I cannot accept the well
established analysis that reduces the Permission to do a to the negation of the obligation
of omitting a (what is not prohibited is permitted) (for example [55]). This is absurd. Per-
mission is something that is “given” to somebody, and he “had” by somebody. It is a social
action and relation. It cannot just consist of the absence of a prohibition, of an obligation
to abstain from a. It is not a lack of some constraint, or of some restrictive authority: it
is the presence of a positive act and relation of an agent (x) towards another agent (y). If
Robinson is living on a desert rock in the ocean, and nobody prohibits and prevents him
from using any part of the island as he likes, he is not “permitted” to do so. Only if there
are other agents with a specific attitude and relation, Robinson might be “permitted” to do
something. If I’m walking around and breathing, I do not got the “permission” of breathing
just because there is nobody (and no law) ordering of not breathing.
5.3.2. Permission presupposes dependence-power relations
(PERMIT x y a) implies—or better presupposes—that y is dependent on x as for her
possible goal G [56] of executing a. X cannot permit y what he cannot prevent y from
doing.16
16 At the institutional/legal level of course practical impossibility is not enough. The action could be practically
executable by y, but not morally or legally executable without x’s consensus. So, y continues to be dependent
on x, but not for the execution of the practical action a, but for the execution of the institutional/regular action a’
that requires as a condition the permission of x. y dependence on x is institutionally, normatively created.
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Social dependence, power and permission. When y is asking x for a permission (for
example of passing or of using something), she is believing that x is able and in position
of preventing her from doing what she needs. So, y is asking x of “let her doing”.
In fact, if y depends on x , x got some social power over y [6]
(S-DEP y x a g)⊃ (POWER-over x y g)
x has the power of (CAN) allowing, favouring y in achieving g, and the power of prevent-
ing her from this. We call this form of social power “power over the other” (more precisely:
over the goal of the other), and also “rewarding power” since x has the power of giving y
positive (goal achievement) or negative (goal frustration) rewards. In the permission re-
lation (asking/receiving/giving permission) there is a mutual belief of x and y about y’s
dependence on x and x’s power over y , as for a given goal of y .17
Permission and practical possibility (why “weak” dependence is weak). One might ob-
ject that in many cases y might have the practical possibility of doing what she wants,
of obtaining what she needs from x , without asking for something. Thus she is not really
dependent on x . For example in example (1) or in (2) y might be much stronger than x and
could just push aside x (1) or take away x’s pipe (2).
In these cases—usually conceptualised as “weak dependence” [33]—the problem is the
correct identification of the goal y is depending on x for. In “weak dependence” notion, y
could and is able to do a, but he “prefers” to rely on x , to exploit x’s help/action. In my
view this notion is quite superficial. In a deeper analysis one should express the fact that
if y “prefers” x’s help, this means that there is a greater utility in this choice: in other
words, y will achieve more goals (for example the same result of doing by himself plus
saving time and effort). Now, as for the achievement of this more global, compound goal y
is strictly depending on x .
In other terms, when y is said to be “weakly” dependent on x for a goal g, this means
that in fact he is depending on x for a compound goal G, of which g is just a part of, while
he is not depending on x as for g; therefore, he (of course) prefers to achieve the entire G
and not just g (if the cost of using x does not exceed the utility of G− g).
The same holds in permission: when y is asking/waiting for a permission for a given
action a when apparently she has the practical possibility (CAN) of doing a, this means that
the real goal of y , which she is depending on x for, is not simply the successful execution
of a, but this plus other results that require x’s (passive) help. For example, she has the goal
of doing a without being impolite or aggressive, or doing a without fighting or arguing
with x . In order to achieve this global goal y is dependent on x and needs x’s permission.
Also the action she will execute is not trivially “the same action a”, since this action will
produce different results under different conditions.
Physical obstacles, conflict, and prohibition. Since in many cases x is not materially
creating obstacles to y’s action, but just could do so, since normally x has just to let y
17 A good formalization of this power relation and than of PERMIT would require a formal definition of
PREVENT (for example, Ortiz [49] and of LET as a form of doing [50]. Notice that there is not true “let something
happen” if there is not (a belief about) the power of preventing it or at least of attempting to prevent it.
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do a, why should y need x’s permission? It is necessary that y believes that there is a
possible intention, motive, reason in x for opposing to her action. So, the fact that x CAN
prevent y , his power is a necessary but insufficient condition for a permission relation.
Also x’s “willingness” is important [47]. Precisely, x is supposed to have the possible goal
that y does not do a.
Y is searching for x’s agreement, consensus. Apparently x’s disagreement, conflict at-
titudes, is consider by y an obstacle to her activity. Either x has the power of materially,
physically preventing y from doing a, and (although at the moment there are no physical
obstacles) y worries about x’s creating such obstacles; or, x’s mental attitude is per se
important for y and creates an obstacle.
In both cases x’s intention, his willingness not to create obstacles, is the crux of the
matter. Of course, y will have the goal that something will NOT happen only if there is
some reason to suspect that it might be so: there is some reasons why x might have the
goal of contrasting y (in Normative Permission for example x’s rights upon a—see later).
Cognitive agents can be prevented from doing something just by influencing them via
communication. Prohibition is in fact a way of preventing, of blocking, just based on in-
fluence. More precisely, x makes y aware of x’s conflict goal: “I don’t want that you
do a” (“my goal is opposite to your goal; I have the goal that you don’t have/pursue your
goal”) [12]. And he communicates this in order to change y’s mind, in order y does not
do a. This is an Interpersonal Prohibition, an imperative of not doing something (based
just on personal social power). So to prohibit is aimed at preventing, and is a form and a
way of preventing.
How is the awareness of x’s opposite goal an obstacle for y’s action? As we said, either
it is just the announcement/prediction of future physical obstacles, or is an impeachment
per se. In this case clearly enough the real goal of y is not only that of doing a, but that
of doing a with the agreement of x , without disappointing x (this can derive from several
reasons: affect, respect, politeness, norms, etc.).
In conclusion, when y asks/needs x’s permission she is trying to avoid x’s opposition,
either material, practical opposition or merely hostile attitudes (goals): in both cases in
fact y is interested in x’s mental attitudes; and there is some reason to expect possible
opposition by x .
5.3.3. Permission empowers
The identification of dependence-power ground of permission explains why permission
is power for y: it gives power to y . In fact, y’s possibilities are augmented. Before and
without x’s permission (a form of passive help) y has not the power of doing a (or of G),
she CANNOT a; after and thanks to x’s permission she CAN.
In traditional treatment of permission this effect was described but is not explained. It is
just postulated and seems quite unexplainable and magical. Consider for example Lewis’s
semantics for command and permission in his Master/Slave game, and the opposite effects
of command and permission on the “sphere of permissibility” [41].
The problem, in my view, is why a command is a contraction, a restriction of the
set of y’s possible behaviours, and on the contrary a permission is an expansion on the
pre-existing set of possible behaviours. My trivial explanation is that permission expands
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y’s powers while prescription (and prohibition) restricts them because of y’s dependence
from x and x’s power over y .
If x prescribes something to y and has the power of influencing y [6] which is based
(especially for prohibition) on his power over y , y’s behavioural alternatives are reduced
to one, and in any case y does not have the power of doing something else without violat-
ing x’s prescription.
If x permits y something (y being dependent on x) the sphere of y’s powers is enlarged:
now she can achieve what was impossible before.18
5.3.4. Permission as a form of Social Goal-Adoption (passive help)
When (PERMIT x y a), doing a should be a possible goal of y: either an active goal y
is considering (desire) or pursuing by a plan (intention), or a goal that x believes that y
might/will activate and pursue.
If (x believes that) y does not want a, he cannot permit y a.
For this reason for example the following dialogue is pragmatically and logically incon-
sistent:
Daughter: “I don’t want to marry Dr. Smith!!!”
Father: “Well, I give you my permission (of marry him)”.19
More precisely, if (PERMIT x y a), necessarily x does not believe that y will never have





Not Eventually (GOAL y a)))
in fact, the father could perfectly well answer:
Father: “Anyway, in case you change your mind, I give you my permission”.
a is not necessarily a current, active and pursued goal of y . When y is “permitted” to do a,
it is up to her, and x lets her to decide whether to do a; and this decision is autonomous
18 To be more clear, I think that to Prescribe/Command and to Permit are not symmetric. They are quite dif-
ferent: Command reduces possible y’s behaviours only if y’s accept it (goal-adoption), although it automatically
contracts permitted behaviours (it is basically true that if something is prohibited is not permitted). Permission
expands automatically both permitted actions and possible actions. This is due to the fact that Permission is just
based on the power-over (dependence) while Prohibition is based on the power-of-influencing that pass through
some decision of y.
19 Notice that on the contrary the father could say perfectly well: Father: “Well, I order you to marry him!” This
shows on my view that it is false that to give a command (prescription, obligation) implies giving a permission.
Command might presuppose that y does not want to, whereas permission presupposes that a is a (potential,
possible) goal of y. Only a subpart of the ingredients of giving a permission is implied by giving an order. In
particular, in commands x, having accepted (required) y’s action (S-Commitment to x to do a) is conversely
Socially-Committed to y to want y doing a and to not oppose this.
I have other problems too with the assumptions of deontic logic. For eample from the cognitive point of view
it is possible to permit impossible things (things that x believes impossible): this is y’s problem. Of course this
makes x’s help very limited and literal, while it is irrational to prescribe impossible things, because the goal he is
prescribing is x’s concern. Either the real intended effect (goal) is not what x prescribes (but some side effect) or
the prescription is irrational.
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and free: no prescription by x is involved in this decision: if y likes to do a (as for x) she
can; x will not attempt to prohibit her doing so.
Notice that (PERMIT x y a) constrains the class of the possible agents y: such an
agent should be autonomous, able to decide about its actions, pursue its own goals, and
base this pursuit on its beliefs.20
Since in permitting, a has to be y’s goal, in permitting a x is adopting y’s goal; he is
helping y to achieve her goal. Note, however, that this is a special form of goal adoption
and help, a quite passive form: to abstain from opposing.
Social Goal-Adoption [6,19,27] is when an agent adopts a goal because and until (he
believes that) it is another agent’s goal of.21 Or better (since this definition could cover also
some form of imitation), the agent has the goal that the other agent achieves22/satisfies her
goal.
(
GOAL x (OBTAIN y g)
)
where
(OBTAIN y g) def= (GOAL y g)∧ (KNOW y g).23
There are several weak forms of G-Adoption, depending on x simply knowing about
a favouring consequence of his behaviour, or on x just letting y do something he could
hinder or prevent.
There is an active help when in order to make the other achieve/satisfy her goal, x has to
plan and execute some action; there is a passive help when to allow y achieving her goal y
has just to abstain from doing something: he has just to let something to happen.
In case that x is in fact already creating obstacles to y’s action, in giving the permission
he is also committing himself to actively remove such obstacles (like in example (1)).
Passive goal-adoption is implied by permission but is broader than permission. Not all
cases of passive goal-adoption are permissions. Consider in example (2) that y , ignoring
that the pipe on the sand is related to x (close to x , discovered and used by x) just takes
and uses it, and suppose that x notices this and decide to let y do it. Is x’s behaviour a
20 I feel it quite contradictory to define a notion of “permission” relative to a slave agent who is so slavish
that commands are automatically accepted and necessarily true. This kind of agent is not autonomous, has no
personal will, does not decide whether obey or not to his master; thus it is meaningless to give him “permissions”
that presupposes some autonomous desires and goals in the agent! If an agent can be permitted to do something
(and thus should have his own goals), he cannot automatically execute commands: he will take some decision of
obeing or refusing them.
21 In G-Adoption x is changing his mind: he comes to have a new goal or at least to have new reasons for an
already existing goal. The reason for this (new) goal is the fact that another agent y wants to achieve this goal: x
knows this and decides to make/let her achieve it. If x is cooperating with y, if they have a common plan, x
although doing his action for his own pre-existing goal, must also do it for y, then for additional reasons, with a
different (social) mind.
22 In helping and goal adoption the awareness of y is not necessary, and also y’s pursuit of her goal is not
necessary. x help might be spontaneous, unilateral, and total (doing everithing necessary for realizing g for y).
23 This definition too is not completely satisfactory. In fact, in the definition of OBTAIN, (GOAL y g) should
be just presupposed: (GOAL x (OBTAIN y g)) shouldn’t imply that (GOAL x (GOAL y g)).
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permission? Not at all. This is just passive help: x could prevent y , but decides to consent,
let, permit, allow y’s action. x’s action is a social action, but not sufficient to exemplify
a Permission relation, despite being just practical and interpersonal (non-normative and
non-institutional).
In this example y is not aware of x’s decision and “help”, even of her dependence
on x; x does not have the goal that y knows about his decision; y does not have the goal
of x deciding of not opposing, and of letting her know about his decision; x is not adopting
both y’s goal of doing a, and also y’s goal that x does not oppose to her and that x let her
know about his decision.
All this is necessary in the case of a genuine Permission: mutual beliefs, communication,
and x letting y know about his adoptive intention. In short, Permission is a form of promise.
5.3.5. Permission as social-commitment
As said above, in giving his permission x is not only adopting y’s possible goal of
doing a, but is also adopting y’s goal of this adoption (permission) and of communicating
(letting her know about this adoption).
Y ’s goal of having the permission is normally explicitly communicated (request for per-
mission), but it could be of course also an implicit expectation. What exactly y is waiting
from x , is a “promise” of not opposing, contrasting her. The promised action (active or pas-
sive) might either be immediately executed or delayed: it depends on if/when y will pursue
her goal (in example (1) and (2) for example it is immediate). More generally what y
expects is a Social-Commitment by x to y .
Giving his permission, x is S-Committing himself to y to not opposing to y doing a.
In case for example that x gave the permission but later—when y is doing a—he makes
opposition, complains, or argues, y can with good reasons protest for x’s attitudes, saying:
“But you gave me the permission!!”.
In fact, through the permission y acquired some rights of doing a without x opposition,
and x , because of his assent, acquired some duties of not creating obstacles.
The same is true for removing personal obstacles. In example (1), x cannot answer “yes”
(permission) while remaining to block the way out. This behaviour is not coherent: saying
“yes” x promised to let y pass, and implicitly to remove his obstacle.
Like in any S-Commitment relation x is adopting some goals of y , and y on her turn is
acknowledging her dependence on x and delegating to x an helping action (either passive
or active).
It seems to me that all the basic ingredients of S-Commitment are there in a Permission
relation.
Of course not every S-Commitment is Practical Permission. Something more is needed.
In simple S-Commitment y is asking/delegating an action/goal to x , and x is doing some-
thing for y; in Practical Permission x lets y doing an action, and he is just requested to
consent, and is committed to not prohibit or contrast (and in case, to eliminate obstacles
depending on him).23
23 This is different from legal permission (law) by an authority, which is a more complex and three-party
relationship between three agents: A (the authority) gives a permission to y and a complementary prohibition
to x about counteracting y’s permitted behaviour. As we saw, A prescribes to x to acknowledge y’s rights.
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Introducing S-Commitment we introduce some Normative stuff also in the merely Prac-
tical Permission. In fact we know that Social Commitment is an act that create some rights
(and complementary duties). It is an open problem whether this creation of rights is merely
interpersonal and “natural”, or it presupposes some social system and social norms (for
example about promise keeping). I’m trying to explore the first alternative as long as pos-
sible, trying to let norms and laws emerge from interactions (and minds)—bottom up—and
not only putting them from the top (society) impinging on the agents. I’m trying not to pre-
suppose institutions but to let them emerge.
In sum, face-to-face permission is a social relation between two agents x and y relative
to a possible intentional action a of y . It implies:
• that y depends on x as for a (and x having power over y as for a);
• that x adopts y’s goal (although in a passive form: not preventing it);
• that there is a social commitment of x to y to not contrasting y .
It creates rights for y and corresponding obligations for x . It empowers y . It requires also
some either explicit or implicit communication (to ask for/ to give) since is based on mutual
beliefs between x and y about the previous conditions.
5.3.6. Towards normative permission: x’s rights, entitlement and authority
Many scholars might consider my notion of Practical Permission, based merely on de-
pendence and practical power, too weak, lacking some more “normative” import. They
might consider the Social-Commitment relation (promise) between x and y insufficiently
deontic. I acknowledge that what I described is the basic and weakest form of interper-
sonal permission. Even in the very trivial examples I used some other important ingredients
emerge, and I untowardly bypassed them. In particular, father-daughter example is, to be
honest, a clear example of more “institutional” permission, based on some form of “au-
thority”; and also in the children example there is something more. What I put aside in
this example was precisely the fact that in some sense x “owns” his pipe (by some sort of
natural right), he has some “title” on it, and y acknowledges these rights and titles. He is in
fact asking for the permission precisely because she acknowledges this and does not want
to violate x’s rights.
The reasons why I ignored this feature are, first, methodological: because I claim that
there is a basic nucleus in the notion of permission which is only enriched but not elimi-
nated by the notion of x’s rights and y’s recognition of them; second, there are practical
reasons. To study permission based on rights and authority is more complex than to study
this weaker form of practical permission. But of course this is just the first step.
So, in the great majority of permission episodes (and in a more specific notion of per-
mission) there is mutual belief between x and y concerning the fact that x is entitled to
prohibit y from using a resource he “owns” or from doing something. Thus the obstacles
that x could oppose to y action are not only practical or dispositional but also normative
obstacles. We know that x could block (or disturb) y’s goal not only with some practical
action (fighting, concealing or destroying a resource, etc.) but simply by prohibiting y’s ac-
tion. And x could be in position for prohibiting it not just in a weak sense (just expressing
his opposite goal), but in a stronger normative sense.
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There is a normative prohibition when the expressed prescription is not just the indi-
vidual personal will of x , but is the issuing or the instantiation of a norm. In this case y’s
action would import the violation of some normative prescription related to x’s will. x will
in some way creates a sort of norm (“authority” is nothing but this capability).
As I said, there is a weak form of practical Prescription/Prohibition as there is a weak
form of permission. If x is able to block y , to prevent y from entering a room or a way,
and he declares to y his goal that y should not pass through, his intention to block her, and
declares this in order to induce y to not enter, x is practically “prohibiting” y from entering
(independently of any rights). There is an imperative of not doing something. Of course
this prescription is not a norm. Under which condition does x ′s will create an instantiated
norm for y? This is the problem.
In conclusion, one should distinguish between Normative Permission-Prohibition-
Prescription and non-normative but just personal and practical Permission-Prohibition-
Prescription. I tried to analyse the latter claiming that there is a common core, and with
the purpose of describing the social-interactive basis of the emergence of normative no-
tions and relations.
In order to fully understand the notion of permission at the normative and institutional
level also the analysis of normative prescription and adoption and of rights is obviously
needed.
After exploring this land between institutional norms and control, and interpersonal
relationships, let us introduce another crucial subject for the theory of informal normative
behaviour: the implicit creation of rights and commitments.
6. “Qui tacet consentire videtur”: the implicit creation of rights and commitments
I will examine here the transition from no rights at all in expecting the other’s “help” to
full rights (in explicit social commitments and even more in formal contracts) through the
borderline level of tacit agreements and implicit commitments.
6.1. From weak reliance to strong delegation (through tacit commitment)
Reliance: making the other realise one’s goal. A goal-pursuing agent in a MA world
is exposed to negative interferences and competition, but it also has a great opportunity:
that of exploiting the actions of other agents, i.e., of achieving his own goals doing nothing
(positive interferences). On the one side, this is very important for multiplying the ‘pow-
ers’ [6] of the agent, i.e., increasing the number of goals he can achieve. In fact agents
have limited resources and limited capabilities and they might have not the power of real-
ising some of their goals, while other agents might be able to realise them—either alone
or together—(Dependence). On the other side, even if the agent were able to achieve a
given goal it might be very profitable to achieve it without spending any resources, thanks
to the action of another agent (Weak Dependence) (4.3). This is quite obvious, however
usually collaboration theories do not stress the fact that in any collaboration one exploits
the actions of the others. In particular they do not analyse the mental attitude behind this
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exploiting position. I call this attitude ‘Reliance’ (or Delegation). Let me now define and
model Reliance starting from its weakest and elementary form.
I define weak-Reliance/Delegation as follows [10]:
Informally, in delegation an agent x needs or likes an action of another agent y and
includes it in its own plan. In other words, x is trying to achieve some of its goals through
y’s behaviours or actions; thus x has the goal that y performs a given action/behaviour.
Usually, x is constructing a MA plan in its mind and y has a “part”, a share in this
plan: y’s task. This is true when x (or other agents) have to do some complementary action
to achieve the goal. However, y’s action can be sufficient to achieve x’s goals, so there is
not always a MA plan (except for x’s mental action of deciding and Delegating).
Moreover, depending on the kind of delegation, y’s task τ can be either an action-goal
(α) or a state-goal (g). In the latter case, x just believes that the other will efficaciously do
some action able to produce g, i.e., it will in some way bring it about that g. If x knows the
specific action thanks to which y will produce g, he believes that y will do it, is able to do
it, and there will be the opportunities for a successful execution of it.
When x believes to be (weakly or strongly) dependent on B, there are three possible
situations:
– x permits (in a weak sense), lets y to do α(this presupposes that x could prevent y
from doing α);
– x is happy about or in any case accepts (by changing his own plan/decision) the action
of y , but he would not be able to prevent it;
– x is himself provoking, inducing y’s action in order to obtain g (this implies that y
would not perform α without x’s intervention, and then x could prevent α).
In all these cases x wants y’s action, expects it, and relies/counts on it for achieving g.
As I said it is possible that y’s action is sufficient for achieving g, or that x should
himself do something concurrent with y’s action α, in order to achieve g. In other words,
an M-A plan is necessary (according to x) to produce g, some part of this plan (sub-goal)
is allocated (in x’s mind) to y while some other part of this plan is x’s own task/share.
Now x’s allocation of α to y , his expectation, and reliance is identical in the two cases.
In particular, I call weak delegation the delegation based on “scrounging”, on the passive
achievement of the task. In it there is no agreement, no request or even influence: x is just
exploiting in its plan a fully autonomous action of y (which might even ignore the existence
of x!). In fact, x has only to recognise the possibility that y will realise τ by herself and
that this realisation will be useful for x , who “passively” awaits the realisation of τ .
More precisely,
(a) The achievement of τ (the execution of α and its result g) is a goal of x .
(b) x believes that there exists another agent y who has the power of [6] achieving τ .
(c) x believes that y will achieve τ in time.
(c-bis) x believes that y intends to achieve τ in time (in the case y is a cognitive agent).
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(d) x prefers24 to achieve τ through y .
(e) The achievement of τ through y is the goal of x .
(f) x has the goal (relativised to (e)) of not achieving τ by himself or by other delegations.
I consider (a, b, c, and d) what the agent x views as a “potential for relying on” the agent y ,
its trust; and (e and f) what x views as the “decision to rely on” y . I consider “potential for
relying on” and “Decision to rely on” as two constructs temporally and logically related to
each other.
I will call strict or strong delegation the delegation based on explicit agreement, the
active achievement by x of the task through an agreement with y . It is based on y’s adopt-
ing x’s task in response to x’s request/order. Strict delegation is always connected with
strict adoption (4.3).
Notice that in strict delegation—given y’s awareness and adoption—g cannot be just a
side effect of y’s action: it must be intended, at least part of y’s goal.
Given these basic notions of any form of co-operation, what happens when y is aware
of x’s unilateral weak-reliance, and x is aware that y is aware, and y is aware that x is
aware of this, possibly without any explicit communication?
6.2. Silent consent
A basis for the spontaneous creation of some form of informal and subjective right and
obligation (where the agent feels subjectively entitled, feels to have some right relative to
another agent, and that the other has got an obligation or commitment) is the fact that:
– x believes that y knows that x relies on y for action a and goal p
“I was counting on, relying upon you, and you were aware of this!!”
“you let me believe that . . .” “you deceived me”!!
– If y is aware of x’s expectations (that concern him) and does not contest them, y is
implicitly confirming and accepting them.
This is the fundamental principle of implicit communication and tacit agreement.
More precisely there is a very important social convention called “Qui tacet consentire
videtur”:
if
y knows that x relies on y for a
and
y could but does not make x know that he does not intend to do a; i.e., that x
cannot/should not rely on y
24 This means that, either relative to the achievement of τ or relative to a broader goal g′ that includes the
achievement of τ , A believes to be dependent on B [56].
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then
y is implicitly committed to x as for a.
Implicit S-Commitment is the result of a special (in)action: the omission of a refusal. y
“lets”, “permits” x believe that y will do a, and rely on y .
By doing this y is implicitly “agreeing” on, “accepting” x’s delegation/ expectation.25
Of course, y’s awareness can be just a belief of x; and can be difficult to prove. This
makes x’s right very questionable and “subjective”.
The subjective counterpart of this informal and implicit social bond can be characterised
as follows:
if
– x believes that y knows that x believes . . . (that x intends to do . . ./relies on y ,
and that x believes that y knows . . .);
and
– x believes that this is relevant for y;
and
– x believes that y could refuse 26 and communicate his disagreement;
and
– x believes that y has not refused/opposed
then:
– x feels entitled to rely upon y’s (implicit) agreement/commitment: x assumes
to have the right of . . . and that y got some duty.
But if x is right, not only she feels to have this right and that y is committed; (from an
intersubjective point of view) really y has got a commitment, given this foundational so-
cial convention (about “Qui tacet consentire videtur”), for right/obligation/commitment
creation.
Notice that such a “convention” is also the result of its recursive application to itself!
It is self-maintaining and reinforcing. If agents do not explicitly reject it, do not oppose
to such implicit social rule and to its inferential consequences (agents deriving rights and
commitments from silence), they in fact reinforce the rule and confirm its acceptance,
thanks to the same rule!
Y ’s awareness in fact dramatically transforms weak reliance into some form of unavoid-
ably strong reliance. It introduces some form of “acceptance”, it changes y’s intentional
scenario in doing a. Moreover, while in true weak reliance x and y can have two com-
pletely different goals as for the results of y’s action a, after the emergence of x’s and y’s
mutual awareness of that reliance relation, they necessarily have some form of “common
goal”: at least x’s goal that “y does a” is common to y , and frequently some other part
of x’s goal are either passive, side intentions or true intentions for y .
25 Notice that in fact if B knows that A believes that B will do a, and relies on this, and this is wrong; if B does
not correct this false and relevant belief of A, B is deceiving A, by a “passive action” and “by falsity” (he lets A
continue to believe what is relevantly false).
26 He is able and in condition of making a refusal explicit.
82 C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92
The same powerful mechanism of creation of a social normative order (the implicit
agreement/commitment) was present in the theory of permission (tacit permitting), and in
the theory of trust. In fact trust is the mental background of delegation that—as we saw—
can be based on tacit commitment by the trustee.
I will also present in the next section a more complex and challenging example: the
emergence of a true social convention (to violate official norms!) on the basis of such a
tacit consent.
7. “Rigor mortis”, the danger of making the informal formal
After this attempt of cognitively exploring such a ‘terra incognita’ of informal, interper-
sonal, implicit normative relations, let us now draw some conclusions, going back to one
of the original questions:
Should we make precise, coherent, explicit but very rigid the rules, norms, conven-
tions that regulate real human interaction in organisations and groups, when we want to
computer-support it? Isn’t this a serious danger of “rigor mortis”? How can we allow flexi-
bility and usual forms of informal trust, implicit agreement, or the spontaneous emergence
of expectations, conventions, duties, etc. in info-societies?
As an example of both informal and spontaneous dynamics in organisation in relation
to norms; and of the risk of making formal what is and must be in a sense “informal”,
I illustrate a very crucial and illuminating phenomenon: the fact that no organisation can
work without a systematic but cooperative violation of norms by its members.
7.1. Functional violations of norms and commitments
Not only informal relations, but even task, role, procedure, and norm violation can be
vital for human cooperation (also mediated by computers), and for effective collaboration
among artificial agents in open MAS.
In this section I aim to apply our analysis of task and role delegation, of social and
role commitment, and of norms to a very important phenomenon discovered in Work and
Industrial Sociology and in the Sociology of Organisations: what they call “the functional
violation/disregard of norms”.
In my view, the understanding and the theory of this phenomenon is particularly impor-
tant in AI and in general in Computer Science approaches to organisation. In fact,
– if it is true that real organisations of any type cannot efficiently and adaptively work
without regularly ignoring or violating some of their own rules, norms, procedures,
– if for being really collaborative and efficient a good worker/member has frequently to
violate some of the rules that regulate his job and some of his official commitments to
the organisation,
one can predict serious difficulties or damages in formalising, applying, and supporting
with information technology the formal and official procedures, rules and norms, and
literal commitments within organisations.
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The resulting system will be very rigid. Notice that several applications of AI to institu-
tions and cooperative work are aimed precisely at such a formalisation. On the contrary,
one should be able to understand the logic and the function of that “transgressive” be-
haviour, and to implement and support it. But to do this we need an explanation of that
behaviour and of its functionality, and we have to know when and why agents do resort to
this behaviour, and when and why it is useful.
My claim is that this sociological phenomenon is just a special case of the general
principle of Over- and Critical-Adoption and of its usefulness for a deep and effective help
(cooperation) between agents (see below and [17]). I claim that the worker/member is just
over-critically-adopting the goals prescribed by the organisation (task, rules, norms), taking
into account the global plan, the current circumstances, the interest of the Organisation,
going beyond what has been literally prescribed or negotiated. As in the theory of over
(critical) help, this decision does not depend on the agent’s individual interest, preferences
or advantages, but exactly on his willingness to collaborate and to adopt the interest of the
helped agent. This is why, applying this attitude to the organisation, those “violations” are
paradoxically “functional”, i.e., helpful relative to the organisation’s plans and interests.
From seemingly bad, irregular, arbitrary and non-prescribed behaviour we see a good
effect for the organisation to emerge.
7.1.1. Levels of help: over and critical goal-adoption
We [8] distinguish several levels/kinds of goal-adoption (help) relatively to the specific
delegated task:
• Literal help—y adopts exactly what has been delegated by x (elementary or complex
action, etc.).
• Overhelp—y goes beyond what has been delegated by x without changing x’s plan.
• Critical help—y satisfies the relevant results of the requested plan/action, but modifies
that plan/action.
• Overcritical help—y realises an Overhelp and in addition modifies/changes that
plan/action.
• Hyper-critical help—y adopts goals or interests of x that x itself did not take into
account: by doing so, y neither performs the action/plan nor satisfies the results that
were delegated.
In over and critical help the agent uses his autonomy and intelligence to solve the problem
of the “client”. This is the deepest and best form of collaboration, although—of course—it
entails some risk due to misunderstandings or to y’s limited problem-solving abilities, or to
power conflicts between x and y . Let’s now see how these forms of intelligent collaboration
apply to organisations and to the phenomenon of norm/rule violation.
7.1.2. The Sociological description and definition of the phenomenon
“Functional violation/disregard of norms” (FVN) is characterised in the following way
in the sociological literature:
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“The repeated and systematic violation of criteria, prescriptions and dispositions in-
cluded in the normative apparatus that defines and regulates (through “norms”, in a
broad sense) a collective organised activity. This violation favours an acceptable level
of functioning of the organisation itself, while the literal and punctual application of the
normative will produce levels of functioning either unacceptable or less efficacious” [43,
p. XI].
As a quite revealing proof of the existence and efficacy of this behaviour, sociologists cite
strange “forms of sabotage consisting just in a rigorous application of rulements” [48]—
what in Italy is called “white strike” and in France is called, very appropriately, “grève du
zéle”. As a classic of Industrial Sociology says:
“ It is well known that the best way for sabotaging an organisation is that of literally
obeying all its rules and refusing to use our own judgement capacity. Beyond what is
obtainable by commands, beyond what is controllable by supervision, beyond what is
inducible by incentives or preventable by punishment, even in the execution of the more
humble jobs, there is a bit of discretion . . . This “discretion” can be used both to allow
or to subvert the aims of the organisation” [3] (re-translated from Italian).
During the Tayloristic period in the industrial organisation one of the main points in the
dominant paradigm of the “scientific management” was the warning to the worker: “you
are not paid for thinking, but just for executing orders and instructions”. The existence of
this paradoxical form of functioning and cooperation within organisations is a real problem
for classical theories of organisation.27 More importantly it constitutes a problem and an
everyday dilemma [43] for the management. Dilemma about what to do: to force workers
to discipline (reducing efficiency) or to allow systematic micro-violations they are aware
of, exploiting the intelligence and local knowledge of the agents? As I have shown this is
the general dilemma and trade-off of “autonomy” in delegation: it is the dilemma of the
delegation-controller [17].
It is important to notice that these violations are not random or rebellious acts, and
are not just related to the worker comfort or personal preferences, but are systematic and
intended to favour the collective work.
This analysis and view has to be traced back to the classical theory of conflicts in func-
tionalist sociology (Simmel; Sumner), introduced in AI studies by Galliers [26]. According
to this view conflicts are not a bad thing for groups and organisations. They do not necessar-
ily damage or destroy the group, or disturb its work. They are functional to the organisation
in several ways: by favouring rapid adaptation to evolving situations, the circulation of
27 Hofstede (quoted in [43]) made interesting empirical research on FVN and created a useful instrument to
measure the degree of norm observance by workers; i.e., how much they assume that corporation norms should
not be violated in any case although thinking that violation would be profitable for the organization aim, and
then how frequently they stick to the letter of the rule or delegation, although the result is disfunctional to the
organiation. This is a well identified phenomenon in sociology of work since the 80s. It is a sort of “hidden self-
government”, where the workers with their own initiative remedy the inadequacy of a too rigid and predetermined
production system, employing a competence and offering a collaboration that is not explicitly recognized.
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ideas, by dealing with the unavoidable lacks of knowledge, planning and control. This is
also the case of FVN that it is just a special case of functional conflicts in organisations.
In fact, norm and task violation creates conflicts although being useful and aimed at being
useful for the organisation. As we just saw, even at the simple level of Over(Critical) Help,
conflicts arise.
For the theory of the FVN, also the understanding of the relationships between “formal”
and “informal” level of organisation, and the theory of “communities of practice” [32,38]
and their effects are relevant: informal organisation is a necessary condition for the working
of the formal one.
Moreover, this topic is strictly related to the problem of “tacit” and non-general knowl-
edge in organisations, which is one of the major issues in current interest in organisations’
memory and knowledge.
7.1.3. Definition and kinds
By “functional disregard” I mean the deliberate violation of a norm/rule/prescription
finalised to make the required/expected work (also) more functional to the organisation’s
aims (over- and critical-help).
“Finalised” can mean either “intentional” (goal-governed) or “functional” (goal-
oriented) [10]. In other words, there are two different forms of “functional disregard or
violation”:
Deliberate functional violations. In order to be deliberate this behaviour has to be free
(one could have done differently), and aware of its consequences and on purpose, thus
the agent cannot be merely self-interested. Deliberate in this case is not only the viola-
tion but also its functionality to the organisation.
Unconscious functional violations. Often in real cases functional violation is also an
advantage for the worker, I mean that it is also a facilitation for him: either physically or
psychologically the new solution is less tiring or more satisfying. There should be quite
rare cases where the member of the organisation violates a prescription only to better
achieve the task and at his own expenses. However, even violations which subjectively
are merely self-interested can have results that are useful also for the organisation, and
this behaviour can be in some way maintained and reproduced by those effects [10,
14]. In this case, although the violation is deliberate its functionality is unaware and
unintended.
However, here I focus on felicitous deliberate violations (where the result is good and
is intended by the agent) because this case is an application of the theory of help and
autonomy. A more complete classification of violations would of course be possible and
useful.28
28 Other cathegories are considered by Manciulli et al. [43]:
– dysfunctional violation, where individuals, groups or categories within the organisation disregard the norms
and rules to protect their private interests, not to allow a good working of the organisation and a good
performance of their group.
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7.1.4. Deontic conflicts and implicit entitlement?
Isn’t such a violation of a norm actually the application of an other higher level implicit
and informal contrasting norm [43, p. XI], or better of a superior implicit contract and
delegation? It might be. Consider that when x delegates/prescribes a task to y and fixes its
modalities: it is presupposed and meant by both x and y that the specified task is useful for
the aims of x (and that y adopts them). So, if y finds some disfunctionality between what
has been prescribed and x’s aims, there is a strange, conflicting situation. We pass from
“do a and in doing a satisfy x’s interest” to “do a OR satisfy x’s interest”!
Should y obey “do a” or the (frequently implicit) “satisfy x’s interest”? The command
(the obligation) happens to be self-contradictory; it generates two diverging norms y has
to obey.
Y must make a “critique” of the literal delegation precisely in order to fulfil the deepest
delegation: i.e., to satisfy the intended need or purpose of x . In violating the pact, y is in
fact keeping the pact.
Moreover, is there not some sort of tacit entitlement, of tacit agreement and permission
to violate?
Linhart (quoted in [43]) suggests that in real organisations there is in fact a social
representation, a fiction, in particular by the management of tacitly allowing functional
violations while pretending that rules remain untouched and simulating that they are basi-
cally respected. They cannot admit and officially tolerate the illegal practice and climate,
so they are acting “as if”, just simulating. However, given what we just said about “Qui
tacet consentire videtur”, if it is clear (felt) that the management cannot be unaware of that
practice, and that they do not block or punish it, this might be interpreted as an assent, a
tacit, informal permission.
However, notice that the disregarded rules do not always remain untouched in a fic-
tive rule-obeying behaviour. Frequently enough this spontaneous functional violation of
norms generates a permanent evolutionary dynamics within organisations. Organisations
do not evolve only by adapting to the challenges of the external environment and to com-
petition; they also change by this internal dialectics between official organisation, roles,
rules, etc. and real functional and adjusted practices. At a given point formal rules, explicit
knowledge, official organisation are changed for integrating or facilitating the functional,
creative, bottom-up practices. This conflict is a permanent innovation and an evolution
mechanism.
7.1.5. Social conventions or norms to violate
Consider this example taken from a research on socio-cognitive organisation of work
in an airport control tower. Flight controllers should use the interphone, also in communi-
– unaware violation, where the agents are either unaware of the existence of the norm or do not perceive the
discrepancy between the norm and their behaviour, so they are both unaware and indifferent relative to either
the functional or dysfunctional effects of this disregarding.
– practical impossibility, where it is impossible to apply the norm or rule, either for normative conflicts or for
practical reasons (this is just a special motive for FVN).
One should add accidentally functional violations; and also intentionally functional violations that are not func-
tional at all: the collaborator intends to improve the organisation functionality but in fact he is damaging the
organisation through his irregular practice.
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cation among people within the same control room. There is a rule about this. However,
the interphone has some drawbacks (for example, voice overlap, misunderstandings, . . .)
and the controllers consider its use not only less natural for them, but “potentially a safety
hazard”. This is why they in fact do not use interphone for messages within the same room,
and communicate “directly”. In this real example we clearly have:
– a systematic violation for functional, cooperative reasons.
Notice that this violation is functional (useful for the work) both subjectively, in the
controllers intention, and—probably—objectively, since this practice must have proved
efficient to be consolidated through some form of reinforcement learning (or evaluation of
results) and through social learning.
More than this, we have in this example a true convention to violate. In fact, the func-
tional violation is no longer an individual and independent initiative, a case of individual
problem solving (this is how probably it was born); it is now an implicit or explicit agree-
ment among the controllers. They know, approve and positively expect that the others
violate the norm; they probably implicitly or explicitly teach a new member to violate
it. They cooperate in violating; both at the very moment of bilaterally communicating with
each other, and in knowing and letting the other violate (also with others) so that they too
can violate. Thus, a true social expectation and prescription, i.e., a social, informal group
norm against the official norm, is at work, and works.
7.2. Implicit agreements again: From individual deviant initiative to the convention to
violate
Let us now examine this example dynamically, showing how such a behaviour can
spread and become stabilised, and how this quite special convention can spontaneously
emerge.
Phase I: problem solving.
(1) Subject A experiences some troubles in executing his task while following the rule
(not only for personal reasons (like fatigue) but for the safe, correct and economic
accomplishment of the task itself).
A engages in an individual problem-solving, and finds (in this case by spontaneously
applying the normal face-to-face communication) a better solution than that prescribed
by the rule: violation.29
(2) Positive expectations about the new plan/means are confirmed; i.e., there is a belief that
this works. This feedback from the results reinforces the solution; deviant behaviour is
rewarded (first level of reward): There is some form of learning and next time A will
do the same.
29 Probably in his solution he does not take into account all the higher level and external constraints that have
determined the establishment of such a rule. Thus in this case the Over-help is a biased.
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Phase II: spreading.(3) B observes A violating the rule; the first time she can feel surprised or even irritated,
but at the same time she realises the resulting advantage too. The actual result is better
than the rule and improves the performance not only in A’s or B’s interest but from the
point of view of the job.
Suppose that the positive evaluation prevails on the negative appraisal for the violation.
(4) On the one side, B will not censure A’s behaviour (she might even approve it). This is
enough for becoming “accomplice” and for having some sort of silent assent (“if you
disapprove, if you want that I do not do this, you must say it”).
(5) A notices/believes this and this is a new kind of reinforcement: a positive social feed-
back for him (second level reward). A will also form or confirm expectations about B’s
behaviour: if he is rather proud of his smart innovation he expects (belief+wish) B’s
approval and also B’s convergence (see below).
(6) On the other side, B will do the same either
– for compliance, since A might expect that B does the same because she does not
disapprove and understands that it is a better solution;30 or
– for “imitation” in the sense that there is social learning: B learns from A, by ob-
serving him, and the innovation spreads around; or
– for both.
(7) A notices/believes this, and this is a new kind of reinforcement, another positive social
feedback for him (third level reward): one direct feedback from the effect of the action,
two feedbacks from the other’s behaviour.
In the very moment that B does the same we are beyond tacit assent: we pass to a tacit
agreement. In fact B complies with A’s expectation (i.e., wish/want) that she does the
same, or—just by doing the same—she implicitly agrees that this is the right thing to
do, and complies with A’s expectation of approval.
Obviously, B too receives the three feedbacks: from experience (“it works!”), and from
A’s (tacit) approval.
Phase III: maintenance and mutual knowledge/expectations.
(8) After this ideal episode, A’s and B’s minds have changed. What will they do next time
in the same situation? They will rationally follow the same solution. Now it is no more
innovative problem-solving, or an individualistic deviation; it is a social expectation.
In fact
A expects (belief+ goal) that
(i) B knows that he will violate,
(ii) B will not disapprove (will implicitly approve) this, and (also because)
(iii) B will do the same, since
(iv) B agrees that it is the best course of action.
30 This pressure or implicit request is particularly strong when A is interacting (in the example, speaking)
with B.
C. Castelfranchi / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 47–92 89
A expects (belief+ goal) that
(v) B is aware all these expectations in A’s mind.
And the same holds for B’s mind. There are mutual positive expectations about the
violating behaviour, i.e., they both predict and want the other to behave in this way
since they do, and they want to do so also because the other does.
There is also some sort of ‘deontic paradox’ since they are ‘prescribing’ (in force of a
social convention or informal tacit norm, i.e., for (micro-)deontic reasons) a violation of
the official norm. It seems to me that there is something more than a conflict between two
heterogeneous norms.
Since A will persist because of these beliefs and the social reinforcement, i.e., because
B did and will do the same, we in fact observe the construction of a true “convention” (not
explicitly established).
If some agent—after the habit has been established—deviates from the convention (does
not violate the rule) he will get only reactions of disappointment and disapproval, and he
will also create some trouble, not only for the novelty but because he proposes an inferior
plan/means. This experience or the fear of it (additional expectations) leads him back to
the convention or maintains his compliant behaviour. As in the traditional theory of con-
ventions, to deviate is not convenient.
8. Concluding remarks
I have considered here only one facet of the problem of normative social control: the
spontaneous and decentralised normative creation, monitoring and intervention. I did not
consider the more formal and institutional aspects of social order.
In particular, I discussed
– some cognitive aspects of the elaboration of spontaneous conventions, implicit com-
mitments, tacit agreements;
– the spontaneous and decentralised issuing and spreading of norms;
– the transition from two party trust, rights, permission, social commitments, to three
party relationships, where some witness is introduced, or some norm and even some
enforcing authority; and
– the important phenomenon of functional (i.e., collaborative) systematic violation of
rules and prescriptions in organisation and cooperation; and the emergence—in some
cases—of a “convention to violate”.
In this perspective of formalising the informal, i.e., the un-official deontic matter, I hope
that I have persuasively illustrated both
– the necessity of studying and formalising bottom-up social control and interpersonal
informal normative relationships; and
– the necessity of reflecting upon the possible dangers of a computer-based formalisation
and enforcement of rules and prescriptions in organisations.
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